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Abstract In considering the college admissions problem, almost fifty years
ago, Gale and Shapley came up with a simple abstraction based on preferences
of students and colleges. They introduced the concept of stability and opti-
mality; and proposed the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm that is proven to
lead to a stable and optimal solution. This algorithm is simple and computa-
tionally efficient. Furthermore, in subsequent studies it is shown that the DA
algorithm is also strategy-proof, which means, when the algorithm is played
out as a mechanism for matching two sides (e.g. colleges and students), the
parties (colleges or students) have no incentives to act other than according
to their true preferences. Yet, in practical college admission systems, the DA
algorithm is often not adopted. Instead, an algorithm known as the Boston
Mechanism (BM) or its variants are widely adopted. In BM, colleges accept
students without deferral (considering other colleges’ decisions), which is ex-
actly the opposite of Gale-Shapley’s DA algorithm. To explain and rationalize
this reality, we introduce the notion of reciprocating preference to capture the
influence of a student’s interest on a college’s decision. This model is inspired
by the actual mechanism used to match students to universities in Hong Kong.
The notion of reciprocating preference defines a class of matching algorithms,
allowing different degrees of reciprocating preferences by the students and col-
leges. DA and BM are but two extreme cases (with zero and a hundred percent
reciprocation) of this set. This model extends the notion of stability and opti-
mality as well. As in Gale-Shapley’s original paper, we discuss how the analogy
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can be carried over to the stable marriage problem, thus demonstrating the
model’s general applicability.
Keywords Two-sided market · Generalized matching mechanism · Recipro-
cating preference · Strategy-proofness · Social welfare
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1 Introduction
One of the main features of many market and social processes is their bilateral
structure and the need to match agents from one side of the market with the
other side, e.g. students and schools in college admissions, employees and com-
panies in the job market (see Arcaute and Vassilvitskii 2009), men and women
in online dating sites, advertisers and advertising slots in sponsored search (see
Du¨tting et al. 2010). A class of “two-sided matching model” for studying such
problems was first introduced by Gale and Shapley in 1962 in their seminal
paper (Gale and Shapley 1962), in the context of college admissions and the
marriage problem. Yet, the original model is quite general and can be easily
adapted for other two-sided markets, such as the well-known National Resi-
dent Matching Program (NRMP)1 for assigning medical students to residency
positions in US.
In Gale and Shapley’s seminal paper, the college admissions problem is
formulated as follows. Let there be a set of colleges C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a set
of students S = {s1, . . . , sn}. Each college ci (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) has a quota qi,
that denotes the maximum number of students it can admit. Each student sj
(j ∈ {1, . . . , n}) can apply to any number of colleges, represented by a strict
preference (ordering) over the m colleges.2 Each college also has a strict rank-
ing for all students (e.g. according to their test scores, interview performances
or other criteria). A matching is simply an assignment of students to colleges
such that each college accepts no more students than its quota, and each stu-
dent is admitted to at most one college. For convenience, we use c0 to denote
a dummy college that takes all unmatched students. The college admissions
problem can then be stated as the problem of designing an algorithm to arrive
at a matching satisfying certain properties. The mechanism that implements
the solution can be considered as a blackbox that takes the students’ and
colleges’ preferences (denoted by p) as input, and outputs the matching, as
depicted in Fig. 1.3
In Gale and Shapley (1962), two desirable properties are defined: stability
and optimality. Stability of a matching means that it is not possible to find a
student and a college that are not matched to each other, but both prefer each
1 Readers can refer to the official website http://www.nrmp.org/ for details.
2 By strict preference we mean that a student is NOT indifferent between any two colleges.
This simplifies our discussion. In practice, ties can be broken by random lotteries.
3 There are more complicated mechanisms that allow students and colleges to
interact with each other multiple times before determining the matching, e.g. in
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003). They are not considered in this paper.
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other more than their current match. In college admissions, optimality means
student-optimality. A stable matching is student-optimal if every student is at
least as well-off as he/she is in any other stable matching. College-optimality
can be defined in a similar way, but it is never used. Gale and Shapley proved
that there always exists stable matchings. Their proof is by construction (using
the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm in Fig. 1). In the special case when
the colleges’ preferences are all based on student examination results, the DA
algorithm is equivalent to a procedure that sorts all students according to merit
and letting students choose the most preferred college (if quota still allows)
in order, starting from the best student. It is also shown in Gale and Shapley
(1962) that the optimal stable matching is unique.
Each student s
Each college c
Either of:
1. Boston
2. DA
Matching 
Outcome
Central Agent
Preference list
Preference list ps
pc
Fig. 1: Classic Matching Mechanism
In practice, it is reportedly quite common that the Boston Mechanism
(BM) (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2005) is used instead. The basic procedures of
BM are as follows: in the first round each college c only considers students who
listed it as their first choice and accepts these students one by one according
to c’s own preference until the quota of the college is filled up.4 In the second
round, only the remaining student without any offers and colleges still having
unfilled quota are considered. Each remaining college then considers students
who listed it as the second choice and assigns offers to them one by one until
the quota is exhausted. The process goes on round by round until all quota are
filled up or all students are already accommodated. One major criticism con-
cerning BM is its lack of stability. Judged by classic matching theory, matching
results under BM are far from stable and thus many students are “incentivized”
to make complicated strategies when submitting their preference lists. In con-
trast, results under DA are both stable and optimal for students. Students can
feel free to reveal their true preference lists. The transition from BM to DA
is therefore suggested in literature such as (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 2003;
Chen and So¨nmez 2006; Ergin and So¨nmez 2006), which arguably would lead
to significant efficiency gains for the whole community. However, our investi-
gation of some practical college admissions systems shows that certain hybrid
4 Under BM, all the offers made so far are committed and cannot be changed in subsequent
rounds. In another word, colleges accept students without deferral. In contrast, under DA,
colleges accept students tentatively in each round and would reconsider all applicants in
later rounds. Matching results under DA cannot be determined until all the iterations are
over.
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mechanism may be more acceptable in society from the perspective of colleges’
enrollment concerns as well as students’ personal interest.
In this paper, we propose a generalized model for college admissions, which
considers the tradeoff between students’ eligibility and interest by adjusting
an additional parameter called reciprocating factor. The larger the reciprocat-
ing factor is, the more would the interest factor counts when inspecting the
applicants. BM and DA are merely two special cases of the generalized model
when setting different reciprocating factors. Our model also extends the clas-
sic notion of stability and optimality by re-examining the formation of agents’
preferences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we elabo-
rate the actual college admissions system used in Hong Kong which inspires our
formal model. In Section 3 we proposes the generalized model for stable match-
ing. Some of the important properties of generalized model are presented and
discussed extensively in Section 4. Section 5 compares the efficiency of general-
ized mechanism with the classic Gale-Shapley mechanism through simulation.
We give some further discussion and related work in Section 6 and conclude
in Section 7.
2 College Admissions in Hong Kong
The Joint University Programmes Admissions System (JUPAS) is the central
system for students to apply to the nine participating tertiary institutions
in Hong Kong (JUPAS 2010). In JUPAS each student can apply to at most
25 programmes in order of preference. These preferences are sub-divided and
made known to the institutions in the form of five bands as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Correspondence between Applicants’ Band Order and Actual Choice
Order
BAND PROGRAMME CHOICE NO.
A 1 - 3
B 4 - 6
C 7 - 10
D 11 - 14
E 15 - 25
The band order is made known to the programmes, however, the inner-
band preferences are unrevealed. For example, in band A, the programme has
no idea whether a student lists it as his/her first, second or third choice.
After aggregating the preference lists from all the applicants, each pro-
gramme will make a “merit order list” for its applicants in accordance with
its criterion for selection. The rating criterion is determined independently by
each programme: although many programmes would adopt a Boston-like cri-
terion which assigns band A students with highest priority, some programmes
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may also rate students only by their eligibility.5 Some unpopular programmes
tend to employ the latter strategy if they find most excellent students have
listed it as band B or band C choices rather than band A.
Finally, after all the merit order lists and the applicants preference lists
are sent to the JUPAS office, a central computer will automatically match
the applicants with appropriate programmes. The matching process applies
the classic student-proposing DA algorithm to give the students the best offer
he/she can possibly obtain.
Although the DA algorithm is used in the last phase, the JUPAS mecha-
nism as a whole is not equivalent to the classic Gale-Shapley student optimal
mechanism in Gale and Shapley (1962), where students would truthfully re-
veal their preference lists.6 Applicants in JUPAS face a similar problem like
students in BM: their band A choices would receive higher priority than choices
in other bands, although there are no discrimination over the multiple inner-
band choices. Actually in JUPAS the applicants are always advised to choose
appropriate programmes according to their interests as well as their qualifi-
cations (JUPAS 2010). It is never a dominant strategy for students to always
reveal their true preferences. Therefore JUPAS may be interpreted as a hybrid
of BM regarding inter-band discrimination and DA regarding the algorithm
applied in the final phase. The statement of “Gale-Shapley student optimal sta-
ble mechanism is used in Hong Kong” by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)
is rather mis-informed and misleading: readers may falsely assume that ap-
plicants in Hong Kong could feel free to write down their true preferences,
whereas in fact there is still room for students to manipulate their preference
lists.
A natural question is why not replace JUPAS with DA as suggested in
most literature. To answer it, we formulate a model in the next section in
order to justify such selection of the policy makers for sticking with the hybrid
mechanism.
3 Reciprocating Preference: A Generalized Model of Stable
Matching
We have mentioned in the previous section that programmes under JUPAS
in Hong Kong have full right to determine how to rate students. Two factors
are the most important: student eligibility and band order. In practice, most
programmes put heavy weight on academic performance in determining stu-
dents’ eligibility which makes the examination scores a very decisive factor in
admission. To simplify the analysis, we assume each applicant would attend
5 Student eligibility is judged based on their academic performances, interview perfor-
mances and extracurricular activities jointly. Examination score, which reflects their aca-
demic performances, is a dominant factor in determining the eligibility. (JUPAS 2010)
6 Henceforth we still use the term “DA” to denote the pure DA mechanism, i.e., the classic
Gale-Shapley student optimal mechanism. Otherwise, we will use the term “DA algorithm”
explicitly when illustrating the JUPAS-like hybrid mechanism.
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a standard examination and gain a total score which ranges from zero to the
maximum mark. For band order, higher preference (like Band A) indicates
that the applicant is more interested in the programme while ranking certain
programme as Band D or E infers the lack of interest.
Let S denote the set of applicants, C denote the set of programmes.7 Each
student s ∈ S achieves a total score fs ∈ [0, fmax] in the standard examination
where fmax > 0 is the full mark of the examination. Each programme c ∈ C
has a quota qc. When student s applies to programme c as his/her r-th choice,
s will obtain a bonus score hc(r) which would promote his/her position in
programme c’s merit order list. Generally, the bonus score should be a strictly
decreasing function over preference order/ranking r. That is to say, the smaller
r is, the more bonus score it would bring. In practice, the programme director
could make a corresponding table mapping each preference order to a certain
bonus score for ease of reference. All applicants are then sorted by their merit
scores in each programme, where student s’s merit score in programme c is
computed according to the following equation:
mrtc(s) = (1− αc) · fs + αc · hc(r), αc ∈ [0, 1]
The first term denotes the original score achieved by s and the second term is
the bonus score for students’ interest in c. In case of tie when students share
the same merit score, fs serves as the tie-breaker and student with higher fs
obtains higher priority. Finally, if all terms are equal, we break the tie by a
random lottery.
We refer to αc as the reciprocating factor (RF), a constant determined
independently by each programme c, reflecting its sensitivity towards appli-
cant’s preference order. Programmes with larger RF place more weight on
applicants’ personal interests: other things being equal, students whose inter-
ests match with the programme are more favored. In the extreme case when
α of different programmes all equal to zero, the matching reduces to exactly
the Gale-Shapley student optimal mechanism: preference order would not af-
fect students’ positions in programmes; in the contrary, when all α are set to
one,8 the matching works in the same way as the Boston mechanism: the first
choice gets the highest priority. For a general αc ∈ (0, 1), say αc equals to
0.2, it means that programme c would count 80% of original score and 20% of
interest factor when evaluating the applicants.
After calculating the merit score for each applicant, each programme could
generate a reciprocating preference list by comparing merits scores of the ap-
plicants. These reciprocating preferences are then sent to the central college
admissions system for further processing. The complete procedures can be il-
7 In our model we take “programmes” and “colleges” equivalently, both as the counterpart
of students/applicants.
8 To be more accurate, besides the situation when all αc = 1, there are actually an
infinitely large amount of pairs αc and hc which can implement the Boston mechanism, as
long as it holds that for any c and r, hc(r − 1) − hc(r) >
1−αc
αc
fmax and αc ∈ (0, 1). We
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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lustrated in Fig. 2 where students’ reciprocating preferences remain the same
as their original preferences ps.
Merit computation 
and comparing
®c (optional)
Reciprocating 
Preference Lists
Student-proposing 
DA algorithm
Matching 
Outcome
I. Preprocess Phase II. Matching Phase
Central Agent
Each student s
Each college c
ps
fs
Fig. 2: Generalized Matching Model
The reciprocating factor we propose in this paper gives programmes more
flexibility in choosing a “reasonable” enrollment mechanism:
– For programmes which hope to stick to the traditional Boston-like scheme,
there will be no need for any change since by default α is set to one;
– For programmes whose sole objective is to raise the average score of newly
admitted students, setting α to zero would be their favorite strategy;
– For other elastic programmes concerning the students’ interest as well, a
suitable α between zero and one needs to be determined according to each
programme’s own admission policy in each admission year.
4 Properties of Generalized Stable Matching
In last section we proposed the notion of reciprocating preference which can
better reflect the selection criteria of individual programmes. It it the student
with higher merit score, rather than higher original exam score, that is more
favored by each programme. With the change of the interpretation of agents’
preferences, important concepts such as stability and optimality should also
need to be re-defined from the perspective of reciprocating preferences. We now
give the formal definition as follows.
Definition 1 A matching is R-stable9 if it is not possible to find a student
and a college that are not matched to each other, but both prefer each other
more than their current match when judged by their reciprocating preferences.
A fundamental property of the generalized mechanism can be then pre-
sented as follows.
Property 1 Matching outcome under the generalized mechanism is R-stable.
Moreover, it is optimal among all possible R-stable outcomes.
9 Similarly, we can use the term “R-stability” or “reciprocating-stability” in the noun
form.
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The above theorem is easy to see by ignoring the preprocess phase in Fig.
2 and focusing on the matching phase where DA always generates stable and
optimal matching given any preference lists. Therefore from the perspective
of reciprocating preferences, the matching outcome under JUPAS-like hybrid
mechanism is still stable and optimal among all stable outcomes.
Since BM is merely an extreme case of the generalized mechanism, we may
easily get the following corollary through Property 1.
Corollary 1 The Boston mechanism, known to be unstable by classic match-
ing theory (see Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 2003; Chen and So¨nmez 2006; Ergin and So¨nmez
2006), is actually R-stable with regard to colleges’ reciprocating preferences.
In previous analysis, we assume all students would submit their true pref-
erences. However, this assumption is unrealistic, especially in practical college
admissions system like JUPAS where strategic behaviors is actually quite com-
mon. We now show some key results for strategy analysis as follows.
Property 2 College admissions mechanism like JUPAS is NOT strategy-proof
in general. The exceptions are when all the programmes’ reciprocating factors
are zero, it is the dominant strategy for students to reveal their true prefer-
ences.
Proof We defer the detailed proof to Appendix A. ⊓⊔
When all programmes’ reciprocating factors are zero, the generalized model
reduces to the classic Gale-Shapley student-optimal mechanism which is strategy-
proof for students (see Dubins and Freedman 1981; Roth 1982). Generally,
when most programmes have positive reciprocating factors, students would
act strategically: students with relatively lower examination scores may try
to avoid some popular programmes where there would be lots of competitors
with higher scores, and list those unpopular ones as their top choices instead
in order to obtain more bonus scores there and increase the chances for ad-
mission.
It is worth pointing out that even though the generalized model is not
strategy-proof, it does not imply that students would always have strong in-
centive to strategize. Whether applicants’ strategies can work or not depends
on how much information they know about other students’ behaviors. For
example, suppose there are five students s1, s2, . . . , s5 and s5 gets the low-
est exam score; there are two programmes c1 and c2, both with reciprocating
factors α = 1 and quota q = 1. If the preferences of students are strongly cor-
related, say all students consent that c1 is better than c2, s5 may try to avoid
the popular programme c1 and list c2 as the first choice to get higher priority.
Otherwise, s5 may end up with no offers at all. However, if students’ prefer-
ences are totally uncorrelated, which means different students hold independent
views to the programmes, s5 may know little about others’ preferences.
10 In
10 In typical college admissions system like JUPAS, students’ submitted preference lists
are private information. Applicant cannot access to other students’ preference lists.
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this scenario telling truth might be the best choice of students. The following
property state this observation formally.
Property 3 Suppose all programmes have equal quota and their reciprocating
factors are independently drawn from a uniform distribution over any range
[a, b] (0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1). Besides, the preferences of all students are independently
drawn from a uniform distribution over the set of all possible rank orderings
(i.e., the uncorrelated environment). Then, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for each student under the generalized matching mechanism.
Proof For readability, we defer the detailed proof to Appendix B. ⊓⊔
Property 3 shows that students would be forced to reveal their true pref-
erences if they have no exact knowledge of other students’ realized preferences
except the distribution. This is one extreme case with totally uncorrelated
preferences. At the other extreme is the totally correlated case where stu-
dents have complete information of other students’ true preferences. Property
4 characterizes the possibilities of students’ strategies in the latter scenario.
Property 4 Suppose all students have the same preference over colleges. Be-
sides, this is a common knowledge among all students. Let the quota of their
favorite college be q. Then truth-telling is a dominated strategy for all students
except the top q students ranked according to their scores.
Proof We present the proof in Appendix C. ⊓⊔
In practice, students can only have partial knowledge to other students’
submitted preferences, probably through the history of admission data in each
individual programme. Besides, students need to estimate the value of αc in
each programme and carefully choose programmes they make strategy on since
promoting preference in purpose for programmes which run DA-like mecha-
nism (i.e., α is slightly above zero) may have little effect in raising their merit
scores in those programmes. On the other hand, in each admission year pro-
grammes would take lessons from admission outcomes of the previous year
and adjust their policy on how to determine parameters like α and h. These
interactions form a complicated extensive-form game which may be repeated
infinitely11 at the time granularity of each admission year. This leaves a bunch
of open questions to be settled such as: whether there are any equilibrium
strategies and if they do exist, would the matching outcomes converge to any
of these equilibrium states after finite rounds of games year by year.
Until now we have focused on students’ strategies in submitting preferences
and assumed that college programmes would reveal their reciprocating factors
nonstrategically. While it seems intractable to characterize the dynamic game
in the long run, we do obtain some analytical result for the single shot game
11 Readers should be alert that this may not be construed as the “infinitely repeated game”
in the standard term of game theory where the set of participants in the game remains
unchanged typically. However, in the college admission settings, both the policy makers of
the programmes and applicants may be different for each admission year.
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in one particular admission year. The following property helps relieve our con-
cerns of programmes’ strategies so that we may refocus on the manipulations
from applicants’ side.
Property 5 Suppose after students submit their preferences, each college c de-
termines its true values of αc and hc(r) independently. Then revealing αc and
hc(r) truthfully would be the dominant strategy for any programme c ∈ C in
the ex post perspective.
Proof We present the proof in Appendix D. ⊓⊔
Here we take the ex post perspective12 since when colleges make their
strategies, students’ preferences are already submitted and fixed. In practice,
when the admission authority evaluate the matching outcome each year, they
can only conduct it based on the submitted preference lists of students. It
would be expensive (or even impossible) to obtain the true preferences of all
applicants via survey13 or other methods. Thus for the single shot game, col-
leges would passively reveal their true parameters once they receive applicants’
preference lists.
In this section we have shown some fundamental properties of the general-
ized mechanism. To further investigate the degree of satisfaction participants
perceive under different mechanisms, we implement simulations and present
the social welfare results different mechanisms induce in the next section.
5 Performance Evaluation for Generalized Matching Mechanism
To define and compare social welfare under different matching outcomes, we
need to quantify the utility of each participant/agent in the mechanism first.
Denoted by S the set of students and C the set of colleges. I = S ∪ C is
the set of all participants and O is the set of all possible matching outcomes.
For any agent i ∈ I, let pi be the reciprocating preference list
14 of i and o(i)
be the set of participants matched to i under certain outcome o ∈ O.
For each agent j ∈ o(i), denote integer r(j, pi) as the ranking agent j
appears in i’s preference list pi. For example, r(j, pi) = 1 means that j is the
first choice in i’s preference list.15 We use r = 0 to denote the unmatched case.
We assume that agent i’s utility is additive and only determined by the
orders of the matching set in the preference list, which can be written as,
ui(o) =
∑
j∈o(i),j∈I
Ui(r(j, Pi)) ∀i ∈ I, o ∈ O (1)
12 For the ex ante case, say colleges need to submit their parameters before students’
submission, Property 5 may not hold since colleges would take students’ reaction into con-
sideration before making any decisions. It would be an interesting future work for analyzing
the complicated interactions from the ex ante perspective.
13 Still, students have no incentive to reveal their true preference to authority after the
matching is over.
14 Here when considering students, pi is students’ original preference.
15 For simplicity, we assume there are no ties in the preference list. Otherwise, we can
break the tie by a random lottery first.
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where Ui(r) is non-increasing as integer r(r > 0) increases. Intuitively, it means
that higher order (smaller r) would generate higher degree of satisfaction for
agent i.
The aggregate utility of students (or colleges) under outcome o is then:
piS(o) =
∑
s∈S
us(o), ∀o ∈ O;
piC(o) =
∑
c∈C
uc(o), ∀o ∈ O.
The social welfare is defined as the aggregate utility of all participants in
the mechanism, which can be written as follows:
Π(o) =
∑
i∈I
ui(o) = piS(o) + piC(o), ∀o ∈ O.
We say matching outcome o1 is more efficient than o2 if:
Π(o1) > Π(o2) o1, o2 ∈ O.
We further say mechanismM1 is more efficient thanM2 ifM1 can always
induce a more efficient matching outcome than M2 under any possible pref-
erence lists of agents. Generally speaking, an outcome would be more efficient
if it induces higher ranked matching. In the context of college admissions, a
mechanism which generates more first-choice matching for students is likely
to be more efficient.
5.1 Simulation Settings
Suppose there are 10 students and 5 colleges with just one quota in each
college. We assume the utility of each agent is as follows,
Us(r) = 11− r, r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}
Uc(r) = 11− r, r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}
Us(0) = Uc(0) = 0.
Thus a first-ranked matching would bring in utility of 10 for either students or
colleges. Notice that the efficiency upper bound is 100 since there are at most
five pairs of students and colleges matched with each other.
The preference lists of students are generated as follows:
Student s evaluates each college c by this formulae,
gcs = βg
c + (1− β)gs(c), β ∈ [0, 1]
where (gc1 , gc2 , gc3 , gc4, gc5) = (100, 90, 80, 70, 60) denotes the social reputa-
tion of each college and gs(c) denotes the individual preference of student s,
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which is independently drawn from uniform distribution over [0, 100]. The fac-
tor β denotes the degree of correlation for students’ preferences.16 The prefer-
ence list ps can therefore be deduced by comparing the value of g
c
s for different
c, i.e., s prefers c1 to c2 if g
c1
s > g
c2
s .
The preference lists of colleges are generated as follows:
College c evaluates each student s by this formulae,
mrtc(s) = (1− αc) · fs + αc · hc(r)
where hc(r) = 110 − 10r if c is the r-th choice in ps. fs is the exam score
of student s, which is independently drawn from uniform distribution over
[0, 100]. We generate the reciprocating factor αc for each college c by the
following distribution:
αc =
{
0 prob = 1/2
1 prob = 1/2
The preference list pc can then be inferred by comparing the value of
mrtc(s) for different s. In case of ties, namely, mrtc(s1) = mrtc(s2), s1 is
favored over s2 if fs1 > fs2 .
5.2 Efficiency Results
After generating the reciprocating preference lists for both sides, the matching
outcome can be obtained by applying the student-proposing DA algorithm. We
then calculate the social welfare under the matching outcome.
In the simulation, we use β ∈ [0, 1], with a step size of 0.01. For each par-
ticular β, we repeat the process of preference generation for 1000 times and
compute the average values of aggregate utility and social welfare. For compar-
ison, we also calculate the average social welfare under pure GS mechanism,
which can be easily implemented by just setting αc ≡ 0 for each college c in
the distribution of reciprocating factors.17
16 β can be also regarded as a signal implying how much information students may know
about other students’ preferences. If β = 1, each student has complete information to others’
preferences since they share exactly the same opinion over colleges. If β = 0, each student has
independent opinion over colleges and thus has no posterior knowledge on others’ preferences.
In general, students’ individual opinion would be more or less be affected by the common
social opinion and each of them would have partial knowledge to other students’ preferences.
17 Here in GS mechanism we let the true preferences of colleges be endogenized via stu-
dents’ exam scores only, since this is how the admission authority evaluates the social welfare
of DA in practice. (One such example is that schools’ welfare is measured by the average
score of their admitted students in equation (1) of Chiu and Weng (2009).) Thus our simu-
lation result can serve as a predictor for comparing the official evaluation results, if there are
any, of DA and hybrid mechanism released by corresponding admission authorities. Never-
theless, if we accept that reciprocating preferences are the “true” preferences of colleges and
regard submitting αc = 0 as certain manipulation to the true preferences, then our com-
parison of social welfare of DA and hybrid mechanism should have been based on the same
(true) preferences of colleges. Since the latter kind of comparison is already fully covered by
Property 5 theoretically, we feel that there would be no need to conduct further simulations
on it (which would not produce any “surprising” results beyond theory).
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Fig. 3: Expected Aggregate Utility of Students over Different Degrees of Pref-
erence Correlation
Fig. 3 presents the simulation results for aggregate utility of students over
different degrees of preference correlation. As we can see, the expected ag-
gregate utilities under both mechanisms decrease as β increases from zero to
one. The upper bound of piS is 50 since there are at most five students who
can receive their first-choice offers from colleges. When β is small (less than
around 0.4), we can achieve about 94% and 92% of the upper bound under
the JUPAS-like hybrid mechanism and the pure Gale-Shapley (GS) student
optimal mechanism respectively. As β rises, the preference list of each stu-
dent becomes more and more similar and there are more collision between
students’ interest in colleges. When β is large enough (greater than 0.91), the
pre-determined social reputation of each college becomes the dominant fac-
tor in forming the preference lists of students. That is to say, Ps would be
c1 > c2 > c3 > c4 > c5 for all students. Thus college c1 would always bring
utility of 10 to the student community, c2 brings 9 and so on, which forms this
lower bound of pilowS = 10 + 9 + 8 + 7 + 6 = 40.
We also notice in Fig. 3 that in general piS is slightly larger under the hybrid
mechanism than under the GS mechanism. This result helps ease the concern
that the JUPAS-like mechanism would hurt the interest of student community
as a whole. The intuition is that while some students with higher exam scores
may get worse in the hybrid mechanism, other students with slightly lower
scores would have more chances to enter the programmes/colleges in which
they are really interested.
Fig. 4 shows the result for aggregate utility of colleges. In the pure GS
mechanism, since preferences of colleges are only determined by the exam
scores of students, all colleges would share exactly the same preference list
over students. Therefore the student with the highest score would always bring
utility of 10 to the college side, the student with the second highest score
brings 9 and so on. That is why piC would be always equal to 10 + 9 + 8 +
14 Jerry Jian Liu, Dah Ming Chiu
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Fig. 4: Expected Aggregate Utility of Colleges over Different Degrees of Pref-
erence Correlation
7 + 6 = 40 under the GS mechanism. The upper bound of piC is also 50,
which occurs only if all five colleges realize their first choices. As shown in
the figure, we can achieve about 93% of the upper bound under the JUPAS-
like hybrid mechanism when β ∈ [0, 0.8]. As students’ preferences become
more similar, colleges tend to have similar reciprocating preference, which
means more conflict would occur among different colleges. Thus as β continues
increasing from about 0.8, the aggregate utility of colleges would decrease
rapidly. When β is large enough (greater than 0.91), all colleges would share
the same preference over students. Thus student with the highest score would
always bring utility of 10 to colleges, student with the second highest score
brings 9 and so on, which forms the lower bound of pilowC = 10+9+8+7+6 = 40.
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Fig. 5: The Expected Social Welfare over Different Degrees of Preference Cor-
relation
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The expected social welfare under different values of β is shown in Fig. 5.
In the same way, we obtain the upper bound of social welfare as Πup = 100.
When β is small (less than 0.5) and students have various preferences over
colleges, we achieve about 93% and 86% of the upper bound under the hybrid
mechanism and the GS mechanism respectively. When β approaches to one and
students share common opinion on colleges, the ratio would both decrease to
80%. This comparative result of social welfare helps justify the implementation
of JUPAS-like mechanism in college admissions. The transfer from the hybrid
mechanism to the GS mechanism can only achieve the well-known incentive
compatible property at the cost of potentially significant loss of efficiency,
especially when students have independent opinions on different colleges.
5.3 Strategy Issues
As we have mentioned in the last section, when students’ preferences become
more correlated, it would be easier for strategic students to manipulate the
matching results successfully. Thus in the following simulation we use β = 1
as an example to illustrate the effect of possible strategies of students.
When considering β = 1, the true preferences of students are all the same
as ps : c1 > c2 > c3 > c4 > c5. We assume there are two types of students:
the truthful ones and the strategic ones. The truthful students would always
submit their true preferences while the strategic students are likely to manip-
ulate their submitted preference lists based on the information they already
collect. In our simulation setting, the key information strategic students may
infer is the reciprocating factor of each college. Notice that in practical college
admissions mechanism like JUPAS, students would know their own examina-
tion scores and overall performances of other students before submitting their
applications. Here in the simulation we assume the strategic students would
know exactly their score ranking out of all students. Then one possible strategy
would be as follows:
Strategy S: submit


p
(0)
s : c1 > c2 > c3 > c4 > c5 fs is the highest score;
p
(1)
s : c2 > c3 > c4 > c5 > c1 fs is the second highest score;
p
(2)
s : c3 > c2 > c4 > c5 > c1 fs is the third highest score;
p
(3)
s : c4 > c2 > c3 > c5 > c1 fs is the fourth highest score;
p
(4)
s : c5 > c2 > c3 > c4 > c1 else.
For student with the highest score, since he/she can be assured to get
into c1, there is no need to strategize. For other students, since c1 is already
occupied, they can shield their first choice and list c1 as their last choice. Thus
the student would manipulate his/her first and second choice as c4 and c5 in
order to obtain better opportunity.
Fig. 6 shows the expected utility of students of either type. Since the ag-
gregate utility of all ten students are always 40 under β = 1, the average
16 Jerry Jian Liu, Dah Ming Chiu
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Fig. 6: Expected Utility Each Strategic (Truthful) Student Gains over Differ-
ence Number of Strategic Students
utility per student would be 4 when there are no strategic students, which
serves as the benchmark for evaluating the effectiveness of possible strategies.
As we see, when there are only one strategic student, strategy S would bring
expected utility of 5.5, much more than the benchmark utility of 4 when all
students act truthfully. As the number of strategic students increases, the ex-
pected utility per strategic student would decrease gradually, but still remain
larger than 4. This result validates the effectiveness of the proposed strategy S
under our simulation setting. The existence of strategic students would make
the students who act truthfully worse-off, however, from the figure we see this
side-effect is bounded as the number of strategic students increase. Even when
all other students act strategically, the remaining truthful student could still
achieve about 92% of the benchmark utility.
Fig. 7 presents the aggregate utility of both sides when strategic students
exist. The aggregate utility of students remains 40 since all students share
the same preference list as Rs. The aggregate utility of colleges (the square-
marked line) is calculated based on the submitted preference lists of students,
since in practice the true preferences of students are unrevealed to the public.
When there are no strategic students, all students submit the same preference
list. Thus all colleges would share exactly the same reciprocating preference
over students, ordered solely by the scores of students. This explains piC =
10 + 9 + 8 + 7 + 6 = 40 when the number of strategic students is zero since
student with the highest score always brings utility of 10 to colleges, student
with the second highest score brings 9 and so on. As there are more strategic
students, colleges other than c1 would probably enroll students with higher
merit scores since strategic students list colleges as more favored choices. Thus
the aggregate utility of colleges based on the submitted preferences would
increase.
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For comparison, we also show the aggregate utility of colleges based on
the true preferences of students in the asterisk-marked line. In our setting of
β = 1, the true reciprocating preferences of colleges would be all the same,
ranking the students according to their exam scores. When all students tell
truth or all apply strategy S, c1 would enroll the student with the highest
score, c2 gets the student with the second highest score and so on. Thus pi
t
C =
10 + 9 + 8 + 7 + 6 = 40. In other cases, some strategic students with lower
scores may receive better offer than they could achieve when telling truth.
For instance, c5 may not receive the student with the fifth-highest score as
anticipated. Therefore the aggregate utility of colleges would decrease from
the initial value of 40. However, this adverse effect is bounded as seen from
Fig. 7, because when there are too many strategic students in the system, it
would be difficult for strategic students with very low scores to achieve better
matching outcome.
Fig. 8(a) - (f) show the expected utility each particular student gains under
different degrees of preference correlation. The horizontal axis denotes the score
ranking of student, and each point drawn in the figure is the average value for
one thousand iterations. The possible strategy students could make is strategy
S. We assume there is only one student behaving strategically while the rest of
students would reveal their true preferences. From the figures we see that for
the top one student, he/she would always achieve utility of ten since according
to strategy S he/she would just act truthfully and can always get the first
choice. Fig. 8(a) verifies that truth-telling is an equilibrium strategy when
students preference are totally uncorrelated: the students would not be better
off when deviating unilaterally from the equilibrium, whereas under β = 1,
truth-telling would be dominated by the strategy S, as shown in Fig. 8(f). For
general value of β ∈ (0, 1), the students with higher ranking would tend to act
truthfully while the students with lower ranking tend to behave strategically
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by choosing the less famous colleges. As the preferences of students becomes
more correlated, more students would have incentive to make certain strategy
rather than acting truthfully.
6 Further Discussions
Pros and Cons Regarding DA and the Generalized Mechanism We
have shown that under complete information, students do have strong incentive
to lie; on the contrary, in the absence of any posterior knowledge, truth-telling
is still the NE of the generalized mechanism. In the simulation, β serves as
an indicator of how much information each student may know about others’
preferences. We would like to highlight through this paper the debate whether
college side would all agree on applying DA so as to achieve strategy-proofness
property, or some colleges would be willing to enroll students with higher inter-
ests in risk of potential manipulation. Our generalized model just establishes a
framework to admit such tradeoff between gain in efficiency and risk in truth-
fulness, and gives each college the freedom to adjust their policy through RF.
It is worth noting that the proposed model does not intend to repel the current
trend of practice of DA. DA is essentially encompassed in our framework and
we just give it a second thought from the perspective of individual college.
To further understand the potential downside of DA, let us consider the fol-
lowing scenario: if DA is enforced in all participating programs of JUPAS, for
those less popular programmes, lots of students with lower scores but more in-
terest would be wiped out, and instead most quota of these programmes would
be occupied by students with higher scores but less interest (their scores are
not high enough to get into popular programmes which they listed as top
choices, so finally end up with an offer from bottom choices).18 One conven-
tional policy in Hong Kong’s universities is that students are allowed to switch
programme inside the university in the end of the first year in case students feel
the current programme is not suitable for themselves after one year’s study. In
this case most unsatisfied students enrolled by these unpopular programmes
would apply to change. If approving most of these applications, those pro-
grammes may suffer from high vacancy rate. However, if rejecting most of
them, the majority of students in the programme would feel unsatisfactory.
This becomes a dilemma for the unpopular programmes. The main objective
of DA is to achieve stability; however, it may end up with “unstable” out-
comes in the long run. This explanation helps rationalize the current selection
of hybrid manner in JUPAS rather than hasty replacement with DA. Unfor-
tunately, these concerns and debates from the college side are largely ignored
in existing literature.
18 We notice a recent publication of Chiu and Weng (2009) which shares the same concerns
as ours. Instead of considering the hybrid mechanism, Chiu and Weng (2009) rationalizes
the so-called “pre-commit” strategy of colleges to admit applicants who rank them as their
top choices.
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Extension to Marriage Problem The generalization of college admis-
sions mechanism also applies to the classic stable marriage problem discussed
in the original paper of Gale and Shapley (1962). Consider the situation when
a woman faces two men’ proposals and has no clear idea which one she strictly
prefers. Technically, we call there exists a tie in the woman’s preference list.19
Roughly speaking, the existing literature mainly provides two solutions to deal
with marriage problem with tie. A quick solution is just requiring the woman
to flip a coin to produce a strict preference list so that the previous mechanism
could be applied immediately. The other solution concerns how to find the op-
timal matching outcome among all these artificial tie-breaking possibilities,
for instance, the polynomial-time stable improvement cycles algorithm raised
in Erdil and Ergin (2008).
However, suppose the woman has the wish: “I’ll choose the man who loves
me most!” Yet the fact is that the first man has listed her as the first choice
while the second man listed this woman as his last choice and was rejected
by every other women in the previous rounds, assuming men-proposing DA
algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962) applied here. Obviously a “reasonable”
matching mechanism should respect each participating agent’ wish and there-
fore always match the first man with the woman. However, existing matching
mechanisms provide no channel for agents to express such kind of reciprocat-
ing preferences, although mutual appreciation is a very natural and common
factor in determining marriage mates.
Our generalized model can be easily carried over to the above scenario. By
analogy, we can define the merit score of man m in woman w as follows:20
mrtw(m) = (1− αw) · fw(m) + αw · hw(r), αw ∈ [0, 1]
where fw(m) is the initial rating score of m in w; r is an integer denoting
w’s position in m’s initial preference list and hw(r) is the bonus score which
is decreasing over r, i.e., the smaller r is, the more bonus score the man can
achieve; αw is the reciprocating factor of the woman, denoting w’s sensitivity
to other men’s evaluation to herself. If αw is set to zero, which is equivalent
to the classic model where a woman only believes her own feeling and judge-
ment. Conversely, if αw equals to one, woman w is extremely sensitive to men’
opinions on her and hopes to match with the one who loves her most. In gen-
eral a woman may set αw between zero and one to strike a balance between
her initial feeling and men’s appraisal to her. Choosing a mate with mutual
appreciation seems more “reasonable” and natural in practical marriage. The
parameter of reciprocating factor provides an opportunity for agents to more
fully express their wishes or perceived payoff than in the classic model. Finally
by comparing the merit scores for different men, we can reproduce the prefer-
19 Readers could refer to this comprehensive survey for recent development on the marriage
problem in Iwama and Miyazaki (2008), especially section on “incomplete preference lists
with ties”.
20 Similarly, by exchanging the notation of m and w in the equation, we may generate the
merit score of woman w in man m.
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ence list of w. In case of tie in merit scores, we resort to original score for tie
breaking.
Related Work Some recent developments in matching theory share our
concerns that the transition from the Boston mechanism to the GS mechanism
is not problem-free and object to the hasty rejection of the Boston mechanism.
One main research direction is the analysis of efficiency in school choice (SC)
setting where schools do not have strict preferences over students and have to
largely rely on random lotteries to determine their preferences.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda first brought up the uncertainty fac-
tor of lotteries into efficiency consideration (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2008).
They showed an elegant example when students share identical ordinal prefer-
ence but differ in preference intensities, the Boston mechanism can dominate
the GS mechanism in terms of expected cardinal efficiency. A new Choice-
Augmented Deferred Acceptance (CADA) mechanism was proposed accord-
ingly which supports a greater scope of efficiency than the pure GS mecha-
nism (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2008). The same authors further generalized
the single example into a “baseline model” where students have common ordi-
nal preferences and schools have no priorities in Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009).
Besides, Miralles (2008) showed that the above analytical results could extend
to more realistic cases such as weak priorities by simulation.
Featherstone and Niederle then classified the efficiency issue in SC into
three categories (see Featherstone and Niederle 2008):
Ex post: Each student knows preferences of other students and lottery results
in each school. The matching outcome as well as the efficiency are both
deterministic.
Interim: Students know preferences of other students but remain unknown
to the lottery results, i.e., we would investigate the efficiency before the
lotteries are drawn. The distribution of lottery results would induce an
expected, other than deterministic, value of efficiency.
Ex ante: Students only know the distribution of other students’ preferences
and still remain ignorant of lottery results.
The authors concluded in the same paper that, when student preferences
are uniformly distributed and schools are completely symmetric, the Boston
mechanism can first-order stochastically dominate the GS mechanism in terms
of ex ante efficiency, both in theory and in the laboratory.
Following the efficiency classification above, results in (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.
2008, 2009; Miralles 2008) would all fall into the interim viewpoint with
highly correlated student preferences, which complements the conclusion in
Featherstone and Niederle (2008) under independent student preferences.
Although sharing the same caution against a hasty replacement of the
Boston mechanism, our paper stands distinct from these above works in several
aspects:
– One key assumption for the above works is the weak or even no priorities
in schools such that lotteries are largely relied upon in schools in order
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to break the tie. It is this “randomness” that causes the potential ex ante
efficiency loss of the GS mechanism. However, in practical CA context
where students’ scores rather than the random lotteries play the decisive
role in admissions, the above assumption would no longer hold, so would
the corresponding conclusions.
– Our paper follows a distinctive and unique research direction and shows
that even when the priorities in schools are strict, Boston still exhibits some
prominent properties such as respecting the interests of applicants. The
sociological consideration of agents’ preferences has been largely ignored
in previous research of college admissions system.
In terms of interdependent preferences, we notice a recent work of Chakraborty et al.
(2010) proposing “interdependent values” in two-sided matching which can
be regarded as a complementary notion to our reciprocating preferences. In
Chakraborty et al. (2010) the authors argue that a college c’s evaluation of a
student s could be affected by (or depend on) other colleges’ evaluation to this
student s, while we consider the scenario where s’s value to c is dependent on
c’s value to s.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we propose a generalized matching mechanism which can incor-
porate both BM and DA. Inspired by a practical college admissions system,
i.e., JUPAS in Hong Kong, we propose a common parameter, namely recip-
rocating factor (or α), for the generalized matching model. This parameter
serves as a bridge between BM and DA: when all α are set to zero, the match-
ing mechanism would be equivalent to pure BM; when all α equal to one, the
matching mechanism reduces to pure DA. Practical systems like JUPAS can
be regarded as a hybrid of BM and DA with reciprocating factor between zero
and one. In the context of college admissions, reciprocating factor is of practi-
cal significance for programmes to achieve the tradeoff between eligibility and
real interest of enrolled students. We have discussed the advantage and dis-
advantage of DA and the generalized mechanism extensively and highlighted
the debate from the perspective of colleges side. These potential concerns and
doubts from colleges would help justify the current selection of hybrid system
in Hong Kong.
With regard to future works, our paper could be further improved and
extended in several directions:
1. One major open question regarding the generalized mechanism is how his-
tory data of admission may affect the strategies and choices of current
applicants. Are there any equilibria for this extensive-form game that all
participants would conform to? How would their behaviors in the system
evolve in the long run? We hope that these strategic issues can be tackled
in the future.
2. How the reciprocating factors of colleges are distributed is another interest-
ing direction which we have not yet investigated in details. Chiu and Weng
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(2009) showed that both popular and unpopular colleges have motives of
giving preferential treatment to applicants who rank them as top choices.
Does this imply that different colleges tend to have similar reciprocating
factors in practice? This question may not be addressed immediately since
these “inside” information of colleges is typically inaccessible to the public.
3. We have showed some positive results of the hybrid system through sim-
ulation, however, simulation alone is insufficient to cover all complicated
strategies of students. As the future work, we plan to design some lab ex-
periments which would involve real participants to play and learn during
the game. We believe that these empirical results would provide more ev-
idence and insight for supporting and spreading the adoption of hybrid
system like JUPAS in Hong Kong.
Appendices
A Proof of Property 2
It is easy to see that when all RF are zero, the generalized mechanism reduces to DA which
is strategy-proof. To prove a mechanism is non-truthful in general, we just need to find one
counter-example for any given RF which are not all zero.
Suppose all colleges have zero RF except college c with positive αc. Besides, c has quota
for only one student. Let αc equal to any small ǫ > 0. Suppose that there are two students
s1 and s2. s1 achieves a higher score fs1 and c is his/her second choice school; s2 gets a
lower score fs2 but lists c as his/her first choice. The merit score of s2 in c is then:
mrtc(s2) = (1− ǫ) · fs2 + ǫ · hc(1)
If telling truth, s1’s merit score in c would be:
mrtc(s1) = (1− ǫ) · fs1 + ǫ · hc(2)
By letting mrtc(s1) < mrtc(s2), we have the condition when c prefers s2 to s1:
fs1 − fs2 <
ǫ
1− ǫ
(hc(1) − hc(2)) , δ
Since 0 < ǫ < 1 and hc is a (strictly) decreasing function of choice order, we have δ > 0.
We further assume that s1 knows he/she would not succeed in his/her first choice college,
thus the best he/she can achieve is getting into college c. By listing c as the first choice, s1
would obtain a higher merit score in c:
mrtc(s1)
S = (1 − ǫ) · fs1 + ǫ · hc(1)
which is always larger than mrtc(s2).
Therefore, as long as fs1−fs2 < δ, s1 would have incentive to deviate from truth-telling
for better matching outcome, which proves that the hybrid mechanism is not strategy-proof
in general.
B Proof of Property 3
Here we follow the terms in Featherstone and Niederle (2008) and adapt their proof for BM
to our context of generalized mechanism. We first give some basic definitions and lemmas.
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Definition 2 For student s, let p be its preference list where college c is ranked r-th.
Consider a new preference list p′ of s which exchanges the r-th choice with the j-th (j < r)
choice college. A mechanism is called rank monotonic if the probability of s being matched
to c is weakly higher under p′ than under p no matter how preferences and reciprocating
factors are distributed.
Lemma 1 The generalized mechanism is rank monotonic.
Proof Consider the notation in the previous definition. Also consider any state of the match-
ing system (i.e., any possible scores, submitted preferences of students and RF of colleges)
where student s submits p and is matched to college c. In this state, student s is rejected by
every college prior to its r-th choice in p, and after c enrolls s, no other students can drive
s out of c’s quota in later rounds. Mathematically, suppose c has quota q and s is in the
i-th position in c’s merit order list, then there will be at most q − 1 students with higher
position than s in c’s list.
Hence, if student s had instead submitted p′, in the same state of the system, he also
would have been rejected by every college prior to its j-th choice in p′. Considering c’s merit
order list, student s can only get promoted since it lists c as higher choice in p′. After getting
into c in the j-th round, since preferences of all other students and colleges remains the same
as under p, there will also be at most q − 1 students with higher position than s in c’s new
list. So s can guarantee its admission to c. This implies that the probability of student s
being matched to college c is weakly larger when it submits p′ instead of p. ⊓⊔
Definition 3 If the probability of student s being matched to its i-th choice college is
independent of its submitted preference list, we say that its preference revelation problem
exhibits college anonymity.
Lemma 2 Suppose there are m colleges with quota q and n students. If the submitted
preferences of all students other than s, as well as the reciprocating factors of colleges are
uniformly distributed, then the preference revelation problem of student s exhibits college
anonymity.
Proof Let student s submit preference list ps where ps(i) is its i-th choice college in list ps.
Denoted by p−s other student’s preferences and α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) the vector of each
college’s reciprocating factor. Let P be the set of all possible p−s. And Rm = [a, b]m is the
m-dimensional space containing all possible values of α.
For each particular p−s ∈ P, denoted by Rmps,p−s,i(α1, α2, . . . , αm) ⊆ R
m the region of
α in which s is matched to its i-th choice under (ps, p−s). Then the probability of s being
matched to its i-th choice can be denoted as:
probi =
∑
p
−s∈P
Pr(p−s)
∫
Rm
ps,p−s,i
1
(b − a)m
dα (2)
Now let student s submit a different preference list p′s. This induces a permutation
mapping f from the set of colleges’ index {1, 2, . . . ,m} to itself which is defined as follows:
for any college cj (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, let rcj ,ps be its ranking in list ps, then the image value
f(j) is the index of college which is ranked rcj ,ps in list p
′
s. By a slight abuse of notation,
we express this permutation as f(ps) = p′s for conciseness.
For each (p−s,Rmps,p−s,i(α1, α2, . . . , αm)), by symmetry, we know that under
(f(p−s),Rmps,p−s,i(αf(1), αf(2), . . . , αf(m))), student s would still be matched to its i-th
choice college in p′s. Since f is a one-to-one mapping, by this way of transformation we would
have listed all the possibility for the matching. Thus the probability of s being matched to
its i-th choice in p′s can be denoted as:
prob′i =
∑
p
−s∈P
Pr(f(p−s))
∫
Rm
ps,p−s,i
(f(α))
d(f(α))
(b− a)m
(3)
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Since preference list is uniformly drawn, we have Pr(p−s) = Pr(f(p−s)). The integral parts
in equation (2) and (3) are equivalent since it is just a simple substitution of the variables,
i.e., they both equal to the following expression:
∫
Rm
ps,p−s,i
(x1,x2,...,xm)
1
(b− a)m
dx1dx2 . . . dxm
Thus, we have probi = prob′i and the lemma is proven. ⊓⊔
We still use probi to denote the probability of s being matched to its i-th choice college.
Combining the conclusion in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have that probi ≥ probj for i < j.
The best response in this case is clearly to put the favorite school in the first place, the
second most favorite one in the second place and so on. Thus truth-telling would be the best
response for students.
C Proof of Property 4
Suppose there are m colleges and n students. Without loss of generality, we assume that all
students share the same preference list: c1 > c2 > · · · > cm. Let the quota of their favorite
college c1 be q and reciprocating factor of c1 is αc1 .
By listing c1 as their first choice, the top q students judged by score (denoted by
s1, s2, . . . , sq with fs1 > fs2 > . . . > fsq ) would still occupy the top q vacancies in c1’s
merit score list. This can be easily seen by the composition of merit score:
mrtc1 (sq) = (1 − αc1 ) · fsq + αc1 · hc1(1)
For any other student sj (q < j ≤ n) listing c1 as i-th choice, its merit score would be
smaller than mrtc1 (sq) since fsj < fsq and hc1(i) ≤ hc1(1).
Thus, the top q would reveal their true preferences and get into their first choice college.
For the rest students, since all the quota of c1 is filled up, they would have no incentive
to still list c1 as their first choice. To prove that truth-telling (denoted by T) is a dominated
strategy, we only need to find one particular strategy which dominates T . We now focus on
one of such strategies which requires students to always submit c2 > c3 > · · · > cm > c1
(denoted by S). Let s be any of these remaining students and the utility of s be ui when it
is matched with ci (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}). Denoted by probi the probability of s being matched
with ci under T and prob′i the same probability under S (notice that prob1 and prob
′
1 would
be zero since c1’s quota has already been occupied). Then the expected utility under T
would be no more than that under S since:
E(U)T =
m∑
i=1
probi · ui
=
m∑
i=2
probi · ui
≤
m∑
i=2
prob′i · ui
= E(U)S
According to Lemma 1, the probability of s being matched with ci (i ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m}) would
be higher under S since ci’s position gets promoted compared with T. Thus probi ≤ prob′i and
the inequality above holds. This gives the proof that truth-telling is a dominated strategy.
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D Proof of Property 5
For analyzing colleges’ strategies, we borrow the idea of dropping strategies and rejection
chains algorithm from Kojima and Pathak (2008) and show that it is impossible for colleges
to find an effective dropping strategy and manipulate the matching successfully. Thus the
best matching colleges may achieve is via revealing their true preferences (i.e., their merit
order lists).
To complete our proof, we first briefly restate some basic definitions and lemmas in
Kojima and Pathak (2008). Let pc be the reciprocating preference of college c obtained
through its true αc and hc(r). s1 and s2 are two students applying to college c.
Definition 4 A report p′c is said to be a dropping strategy if (i) pc : s1 > s2 and p
′
c : s1 > ∅
imply p′c : s1 > s2, and (ii) pc : ∅ > s1 implies p
′
c : ∅ > s1.
In other words, a dropping strategy of a college is obtained by removing some students from
its true lists of acceptable students, which never changes its relative preference of any two
students.
Lemma 3 (Dropping strategies are exhaustive): If under certain strategy p′c the mechanism
produces matching outcome µ, then there must exist a dropping strategy of college c that
produces a matching that c weakly prefers to µ according to its true preference pc.
The detailed proof can be found in Appendix B of Kojima and Pathak (2008). Lemma 3
implies that if there exists any successful strategy p′c for college c (by manipulating its
αc and hc(r)), we can always find a dropping strategy which achieves at least the same
improvement. That is to say, if we can prove that for every dropping strategy, we cannot
make college c better off, then c would be forced to act truthfully.
For any dropping strategies, the “dropped” students in c would re-apply to other col-
leges in the student-proposing DA algorithm, which would cause a chain of rejection and
acceptance in the subsequent stages. This can be analyzed in details through the so-called
rejection chains algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 1. Rejection Chains
Let µ be the outcome of student-proposing DA algorithm and B1c a subset of µ(c). Let c
reject all the applicants in B1c . Initially, we set i = 0 and flag = false.
BEGIN
Let i := i+ 1;
1. If Bic = ∅, return;
2. Otherwise, let s be the least preferred student by c among Bic, and let B
i+1
c := B
i
c\s.
3. Iterate the following steps.
(a) s continues to apply:
i. If s has already applied to every college in ps, GO TO BEGIN;
ii. Otherwise, let c′ be the most preferred college of s among those which s has
not yet applied. If c′ = c, set flag = ture then return;
(b) Acceptance and/or rejection:
i. If c′ has no vacant position and prefers each of its current mates to s, then c′
rejects s, GO TO Step 3.
ii. Otherwise, c′ accepts s. If c′ has a vacant position,GO TO BEGIN; Otherwise,
c′ rejects the least preferred student among those who were matched to c′. Let
this rejected student be s then GO TO Step 3;
END
When Algorithm 1 returns, flag could be either false or true. We say that Algorithm
1 returns to c if it returns with flag = true.
We then re-state Lemma 3 in Kojima and Pathak (2008) as follows:
Lemma 4 For any c ∈ C, if Algorithm 1 does not return to c for any non-empty B1c ⊆ µ(c),
then c cannot profitably manipulate by a dropping strategy.
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Therefore the proof can be now boiled down to answer whether Algorithm 1 can possibly
return to c after applying any dropping strategy. This is summarized in the following lemma
as the final step of proof.
Lemma 5 In the generalized mechanism, Algorithm 1 can never return to college c with
strictly better µ(c) if it applied any dropping strategies.
Proof Assuming that Algorithm 1 returns to c with strictly better µ(c) after finite steps of
iterations. By retrieving the running process of Algorithm 1, we would be able to reconstruct
a complete chain21 of rejection and acceptance as follows (Denote c = c1 = cn):
c1 − s1 − c2 − s2 − · · · − cn−1 − sn−1 − cn
The above chain reflects the latest iteration before Algorithm 1 returns with flag = true.
It starts from c1 (i.e., c) rejecting s1, then s1 applied to c2 following its own preference ps1 ;
after comparing s1 and s2, c2 decided to accept s1 and reject s2; then s2 started its new
application and so on. Finally, sn−1 was rejected by cn−1 and applied to cn (i.e., c), which
satisfies the stopping condition of Algorithm 1 with flag = true.
By inspecting the behavior of c2, we know that s2 applied to it earlier than s1 (which
implies s2 obtained higher bonus score than s1 in c2) but is still less favored by c2. The only
explanation for this phenomenon is that s1 achieved strictly better exam score than s2, i.e.,
fs1 > fs2 . This rule also applies to other colleges in this chain. In the end, since we suppose
c achieves better matching through the dropping strategy, sn−1 is regarded better than s1
for c, which implies that fsn−1 > fs1 . In summary, we have:
fs1 > fs2
fs2 > fs3
· · ·
fsn−2 > fsn−1
fsn−1 > fs1
By adding the left side and right side of those inequations, we derive 0 > 0, an apparent
contradiction!
Thus our initial assumption cannot be true and colleges may not manipulate their
preference successfully. ⊓⊔
References
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Che, Y., Yasuda, Y., 2008. Expanding “Choice” in School Choice.
SSRN:1308730.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Che, Y., Yasuda, Y., 2009. Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School
Choice: the “Boston” Mechanism Reconsidered. SSRN:1456088.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Pathak, P., Roth, A., So¨nmez, T., 2005. The Boston Public School
Match. American Economic Review. 95(2), 368 - 371.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., So¨nmez, T., 2003. School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach.
American Economic Review. 93, 729 - 747.
Arcaute, E., Vassilvitskii, S., 2009. Social Networks and Stable Matchings in the Job Market.
In: Proceedings of the 5rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics.
220 - 231.
Chakraborty, A., Citanna, A., Ostrovsky, M., 2010. Two-sided Matching with Interdepen-
dent Values. Journal of Economic Theory. 145, 85 - 105.
Chen, Y., So¨nmez, T., 2006. School Choice: An Experimental Study. Journal of Economic
Theory. 127, 202 - 231.
21 To be exact, it may be called a rejection “cycle” since the starting point of the chain
coincides with its ending point.
Reciprocating Preferences Stablize Matching: College Admissions Revisited 27
Chiu, Y., Weng, W., 2009. Endogenous Preferential Treatment in Centralized Admissions.
RAND Journal of Economics. 40(2), 258 - 282.
Dubins, L., Freedman, D., 1981. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm. American
Mathematical Monthly. 88(7), 485 - 494.
Du¨tting, P., Henzinger, M., Weber, I., 2010. Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the
Hungarian Method. In: Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on Theoretical
Aspects of Computer Science. 287 - 298.
Erdil, A., Ergin, H., 2008. What’s the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in
School Choice. American Economic Review. 98(3), 669 - 689.
Ergin, H., So¨nmez, T., 2006. Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism. Journal
of Public Economics. 90, 215 - 237.
Featherstone, C., Niederle, M., 2008. Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An
Experimental Investigation. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
14618.
Gale, D., Shapley, L., 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American
Mathemathical Monthly. 69, 9 - 15.
Iwama, K., Miyazaki, S., 2008. A Survey of the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants.
In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Informatics Education and Research
for Knowledge-Circulating Society 2008. 131 - 136.
Joint University Programmes Admissions System (JUPAS), http://www.jupas.edu.hk. Last
accessed on May. 1, 2011.
Kojima, F., Pathak, A., 2008. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Mar-
kets. American Economic Review. 99(3), 608 - 627.
Miralles, A., 2008. School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism. Unpublished results.
Roth, A., 1982. The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives. Mathematics of Op-
erations Research. 7(4), 617 - 628.
28 Jerry Jian Liu, Dah Ming Chiu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Score Ranking of Students
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 U
tili
ty
 T
he
 S
tu
de
nt
 G
ai
ns
 
 
Strategic
Truthful
(a) β = 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Score Ranking of Students
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 U
tili
ty
 T
he
 S
tu
de
nt
 G
ai
ns
 
 
Strategic
Truthful
(b) β = 0.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Score Ranking of Students
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 U
tili
ty
 T
he
 S
tu
de
nt
 G
ai
ns
 
 
Strategic
Truthful
(c) β = 0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Score Ranking of Students
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 U
tili
ty
 T
he
 S
tu
de
nt
 G
ai
ns
 
 
Strategic
Truthful
(d) β = 0.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Score Ranking of Students
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 U
tili
ty
 T
he
 S
tu
de
nt
 G
ai
ns
 
 
Strategic
Truthful
(e) β = 0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Score Ranking of Students
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 U
tili
ty
 T
he
 S
tu
de
nt
 G
ai
ns
 
 
Strategic
Truthful
(f) β = 1
Fig. 8: The Expected Utility Each Student Gains under Different Values of β,
Sorted by Score Ranking of Students
